The Bank of Russia on Sept. 18 proposed a rule that would cap a bank’s covered exposure to crypto assets and foreign digital instruments at 1% of its own funds, introducing new prudential ratios for both standalone credit institutions and banking groups.

The draft creates two ratios: N31 for individual credit institutions and N32 for banking groups on a consolidated basis. Both compare covered crypto-related exposure with the institution’s capital. According to the proposal, the scope includes direct and indirect investments, derivatives linked to crypto prices, and instruments such as loans and bonds whose value depends on crypto assets or foreign digital instruments.

The framework also limits how banks can recognize hedges. Long and short positions would be netted only within a qualifying lower-risk category, which keeps the capital calculation conservative. That approach suggests the central bank is less focused on enabling broad risk offsetting and more focused on containing crypto-linked exposure within a tight prudential boundary.

Customer assets receive different treatment depending on whether the bank is liable for losses. Custody positions enter the N31 or N32 calculation when the bank bears that liability. Client custody positions for which the bank is not liable would receive a 50% risk weight, while liable positions would face a 1,250% risk weight. The distinction leaves room for custody services without automatically treating all customer crypto as the bank’s proprietary risk.

The proposal is part of Russia’s broader effort to bring crypto activity into a supervised framework while maintaining restrictions in other areas. Earlier policy steps pointed to regulated crypto trading, the use of banks and brokers as controlled access points, and a continued ban on using cryptocurrencies for domestic payments. Under the current draft, official publication is expected in the fourth quarter of 2026, with the requirements taking effect 10 days later. Banks would begin reporting turnover in the covered instruments and their N31 and N32 values from January 2027.

Why It Matters

The proposal shows how Russian regulators are approaching institutional crypto access: permit limited participation, but ring-fence it with bank-capital rules. That matters because banks are often the main bridge between regulated finance and digital-asset markets. A 1% cap, combined with strict treatment of liable custody positions, could allow crypto services to develop without letting volatile exposures become a meaningful part of bank balance sheets.

It also points to a market structure in which crypto activity is increasingly routed through licensed financial intermediaries rather than left at the edge of the financial system. For banks, exchanges, and custody providers, the practical significance is less about immediate expansion and more about how Russia defines the terms under which institutional access can exist at all.